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Abstract 
Knowledge-making practices in biology are being strongly affected by the availability of data on an 
unprecedented scale, the insistence on systemic approaches and growing reliance on bioinformatics 
and digital infrastructures. What role does theory play within data-intensive science, and what does 
that tell us about scientific theories in general? To answer these questions, I focus on the Open 
Biomedical Ontologies, digital classification tools that have become crucial to sharing results 
across research contexts in the biological and biomedical sciences, and argue that they constitute 
an example of classificatory theory. This form of theorising emerges from classification practices in 
conjunction with experimental know-how and expresses the knowledge underpinning the analysis 
and interpretation of data disseminated online. 
 





1. Introduction: Questioning the Role of Theory in Data-Intensive Science 
Over the last three decades, new ways to disseminate and analyse scientific data have facilitated a 
large shift in research practices. This is not simply a quantitative shift, brought about by the speed 
and quantity of data available online: it is a qualitative shift in how scientific research is carried out, 
with important consequences for what counts as scientific knowledge and how that knowledge is 
obtained and used. Prominent scientists have characterised this shift as leading to a new, ‘data-
intensive’ paradigm for research, encompassing innovative ways to produce, store, disseminate and 
interpret huge masses of data across several fields ranging from physics to climate science (Hey, 
Tansley and Tolle 2009). The biological sciences are one of the most fertile and receptive areas to 
these developments (Leonelli 2012). Thanks to high-throughput technologies for data production 
such as sequencing and microarray experiments, the collection of data within experimental biology 
has become increasingly fast and automated, resulting in the production of billions of data-points in 
need of a biological interpretation. Massive research efforts are devoted to the dissemination and 
modelling of data through the internet, by means of infrastructures such as online databases, in the 
hope that digital access will enable researchers to use these data to generate biological insights. 
Biologists can now gather and integrate data obtained on a wide variety of organisms by 
laboratories across the globe, no matter which specific expertises and interests guide the production 
of data at each of those locations (Rhee and Crosby 2005, Blake and Bult 2005, Leonelli 2009). The 
practices devoted to extracting inferences from data in silico are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, resulting in discoveries obtained through the analysis of datasets available online 
(thus without carrying out experiments and/or data collection in vivo; see Buetow 2005). Examples 
of data-intensive discovery include:  
• corroborating a claim through the triangulation of evidence acquired on the same 
phenomenon through independently conducted inquiries;1 for instance, the discovery that 
                                                 
1 For a sophisticated analysis of the notion of triangulation, see Wylie 2002. 
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the same genes or pathways play similar regulatory roles across species is often due to the 
possibility to retrieve and compare data that would have otherwise been buried in specific 
laboratories or within circumscribed disciplinary circles; 
• identifying new patterns or correlations through data mining: a striking instance of this are 
so-called ‘random walks’ through data, where software is used to search existing datasets 
for statistically significant patterns (e.g. gene-pair interactions in biological networks of 
specific model organisms; Chipman and Singh 2009);  
• spotting gaps in the existing knowledge about a given entity: the accumulation of evidence 
can point researchers towards areas of investigation that are not yet charted, as when 
discovering 'ultra-conserved regions' in vertebrate DNA and their regulatory role in 
development (Blake and Bult 2005).2 
The examples above capture new ways in which computational and experimental practices are 
combined in order to make sense of existing data. In all of these cases, computational tools for data 
analysis are assigned a prominent role in facilitating the extraction of patterns from data, while 
experimental work is conceived as means to verify and explain those patterns. Indeed, data-
intensive research as a whole could be defined as fostering the use of automated inferential 
procedures from data available online as a starting point for inquiry. 
 
This situation raises a deep philosophical question, namely how to characterise the methodology 
and epistemic significance of these practices, and particularly the role of theory and hypotheses in 
this context. This question is hotly debated within scientific circles, where proponents of this 
approach argue that in silico analyses of high-throughput datasets are giving rise to a new kind of 
                                                 
2 Of course, there have long been expectations in molecular systematics that there would be highly 
conserved areas of the genome, and that these will serve to indicate relatedness. Data-intensive 
methods offer new, efficient ways to spot these areas, thus making it possible to explore their 
significance.  
4 
epistemology, one in which the automated analysis of evidence claims primacy over traditional 
practices of experimentation, theorisation and hypothesis-testing (Hey, Tansley and Tolle 2009). 
This paper aims to explore this claim from a philosophical perspective, by exploring the role played 
by theories in the design, development and use of computational tools for data analysis. My analysis 
stands in contrast to a simplistic understanding of data-intensive science as juxtaposed to 
‘hypothesis-driven’ research, i.e. as based on the inductive inference of patterns from datasets 
leading to the formulation of testable claims without recourse to pre-conceived hypotheses. As 
recognised by both champions and critics of data-intensive research (Allen 2001, Kell and Oliver 
2004, O’Malley et al 2009), extracting biologically meaningful inferences from data involves a 
complex interplay of components, such as reliance on background knowledge, model-based 
reasoning and iterative tinkering with materials and instruments. Thus, a simplistic opposition 
between inductive and deductive procedures does not help to understand the epistemic 
characteristics of this research mode. The question that needs to be asked about data-intensive 
science is not whether it includes some form of theoretical assumption, which it certainly does, but 
rather whether it uses theories in a way that distinguishes it from other forms of inquiry – and what 
does this tell us about the epistemology of current research. 
 
The scientific context within which I address this question is model organism biology, which 
encompasses several instances of data-intensive science given its increasing reliance on databases 
for the storage, retrieval, analysis and modelling of data. Research on well-established model 
organisms (such as the plant Arabidopsis thaliana, the worm Caenorhabditis elegans, the zebrafish 
Danio rerio and the fruit-fly Drosophila melanogaster) has grown hand in hand with databases and 
repositories that freely and openly disseminate data across research communities around the globe 
(Bult 2006, Leonelli and Ankeny 2012). Within this context, a classification system was developed 
that is proving crucial to the ordering, analysis and re-use of data for purposes of discovery: the bio-
ontology. Bio-ontologies enable researchers from different disciplines and locations to share 
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resources of common interest through the Internet, and use them to further research (Ashburner et al 
2000, Backlawski and Niu 2006). For the purposes of this paper, I restrict my examination to the 
bio-ontologies collected by the Open Biomedical Ontologies [OBO] Consortium, an organisation 
founded to facilitate communication and coherence among bio-ontologies with broadly similar 
characteristics (Smith et al 2007). In particular, I shall focus on one of the bio-ontologies in the 
OBO Consortium, the Gene Ontology, which is widely regarded as the most successful case of bio-
ontology construction to date and used as a template for developing several other prominent bio-
ontologies (Ashburner et al 2000, Brazma et al 2006). It is important to note the specific focus of 
my discussion at the outset, because since the development of the Gene Ontology several other 
formalisations for bio-ontologies were introduced and the status and place of the OBO format 
among them is hotly disputed (Egaña Aranguren et al 2007). For instance, ontologies constructed 
using the Web Ontology Language (OWL) are increasingly attracting attention as a useful 
alternative to the OBO format, and efforts are under way to make the two systems compatible (e.g. 
Hoehndorf 2010;  Hamid Tirmizi et al 2011). These differences and convergences are crucial to the 
future development of bio-ontologies and the extent of their popularity in model organism research; 
however, they are not relevant to my philosophical analysis, which focuses on the features currently 
adopted by the OBO Consortium in order to serve the community of experimental biologists that 
uses them. The Gene Ontology is particularly relevant to my argument not only because of its 
foundational status among bio-ontologies, but also because it has been explicitly developed in order 
to facilitate data integration, comparison and re-use across model organism communities (Leonelli 
2010). Bio-ontologies may be used for other endeavors, such as for instance managing and 
accessing data in the first place (that is, even before they are circulated beyond the laboratory where 
they are originally produced).3 The Gene Ontology, as many within the OBO Consortium, is 
specifically devoted to represent the biological knowledge underlying the re-use of data within new 
                                                 
3 A useful overview of the various purposes for which bio-ontologies are developed can be found in 
Keet (2010). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this paper out to me.  
6 
research contexts: in other words, it defines the ontology that researchers need to share to 
successfully draw new inferences from existing datasets (Ashburner et al 2000, Lewis 2004, Renear 
and Palmer 2009). At the same time, the Gene Ontology is constantly modified depending on the 
state of research and the interests of their users, and the mechanisms through which it is updated 
make this bio-ontology particularly helpful in disseminating data for the purpose of discovery 
(Leonelli et al 2011). In this paper, I argue that understanding how bio-ontologies such as the Gene 
Ontology work is crucial in order to uncover the epistemic structure and modus operandum of data-
intensive science, and particularly the role of theory within it. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. After a brief overview of what bio-ontologies such as the 
Gene Ontology consist of and how they are developed, I argue that they exemplify the role played 
in data-intensive science by one specific form of theory, which I call classificatory theory. This way 
of theorising is strongly grounded in the interrelation between practices of description and 
classification on the one hand, and experimental practices on the other. I suggest that the roots of 
this type of theorising are deep, yet received relatively little attention in philosophy until now; and I 
discuss the significance of this analysis towards existing philosophical conceptions of classification 
and theory, as well as towards understanding data-intensive science. 
 
1. Bio-ontologies: Representing Knowledge to Disseminate Data 
Open Biomedical Ontologies are classification tools that have been recently developed to facilitate 
the dissemination of data across research contexts through digital databases. They are crucial to the 
functioning of databases in several ways: they provide a means to classify, retrieve and analyse vast 
amounts of data of different types; they store and organise those data on the basis of users’ own 
research interests, which facilitates data retrieval; and they make data travel across research 
contexts, model organism communities and separate disciplines (Ashburner et al 2000; Smith et al 
2007; Leonelli 2010). They consist of a network of related terms, where each term denotes a 
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specific biological phenomenon and is used as a category to classify data relevant to the study of 
that phenomenon. In the words of two of the scientists who contributed to their development, bio-
ontologies are ‘formal representations of areas of knowledge in which the essential terms are 
combined with structuring rules that describe the relationship between the terms. Knowledge that is 
structured in a bio-ontology can then be linked to the molecular databases’ (Bard and Rhee 2004).  
 
Here is how this type of bio-ontologies work. Every term is assigned a precise definition, which 
describes the characteristics of the phenomenon which the term is intended to designate, sometimes 
including species-specific exceptions (Baclawski and Niu 2006, 35). For instance, the term 
‘nucleus’ is defined as follows: 
‘A membrane-bound organelle of eukaryotic cells in which chromosomes are housed 
and replicated. In most cells, the nucleus contains all of the cell’s chromosomes 
except the organellar chromosomes, and is the site of RNA synthesis andprocessing. 
In some species, or in specialized cell types, RNA metabolism or DNA replication 
may be absent’ (GO website, accessed July 2010). 
 
Each bio-ontology term can be linked to a dataset through a process called annotation. This process, 
carried out by bio-ontology curators, includes searching biological publications for data that have 
reliably been associated with a given phenomenon, and that can therefore be safely assumed to 
provide evidence about that phenomenon. These data, which might have widely diverse 
provenance, are then classified together under the label provided by the bio-ontology term. As a 
result of annotation, biologists can type the terms that best describe their research interests into the 
search engine of any database that uses the bio-ontology, and get instant access to the data available 
on the phenomena of interest. The definitions assigned to bio-ontology terms are thus intended to be 
descriptive of phenomena – in other words, to capture existing knowledge about the features and 
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components of actual biological entities and processes. At the same time, terms in bio-ontologies 
function as classificatory categories through which datasets can be organised and retrieved. 
 
Terms are related through a network structure. The basic relationship between terms is called 
containment and it involves a parent term and a child term. The child term is contained by the 
parent term when the child term represents a more specific category of the parent term. This 
relationship is fundamental to the organisation of the bio-ontology network, as it supports a 
hierarchical ordering of the terms used. The criteria used to order terms are chosen in relation to the 
characteristics of the phenomena captured within each bio-ontology. For example, the Gene 
Ontology uses three types of relations among terms: ‘is_a’, ‘part_of’ and ‘--regulates’.4 The first 
category denotes relations of identity, as in ‘the nuclear membrane is a membrane’; the second 
category denotes mereological relations, such as ‘the membrane is part of the cell’; and the third 
category signals regulatory roles, as in ‘induction of apoptosis regulates apoptosis’. In other bio-
ontologies, the categories of relations available can be more numerous and complex: for instance, 
including relations signalling measurement (‘measured_as’) or belonging (‘of_a’). One way to 
visualise bio-ontologies is to focus on their hierarchical structure as a network of terms, as 
illustrated in figure 1. This approach is the one preferred by experimental scientists, who use it to 
focus on the ways in which terms are related to each other.  
 
[figure 1]  
 
Another, more philosophically interesting way to view bio-ontologies is to conceive of them as a 
series of descriptive propositions about biological entities and processes. So in the example 
                                                 
4 Note that ‘regulates’ is not organized in the parent/child structure. Also, the Gene Ontology is now 
in the process of incorporating another two types of relations, ‘has_part’ and ‘occurs_in’, and could 
potentially adopt many other types of relations, as documented by Smith et al (2005). 
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provided in figure 1, the bio-ontology tells us that ‘cell development is part of cell differentiation’ 
and ‘cell development is a cellular process’. One can assign meaning to these statements by 
appealing to the definitions given to the terms ‘cell development’, ‘cell differentiation’ and ‘cellular 
process’, as well as to the relations ‘is_a’ and ‘part_of’. Similarly, one learns that ‘neural crest 
formation is part of neural crest cell development’ and that ‘neural crest formation is an epithelial to 
mesenchrymal transition’. Viewed in this way, bio-ontologies consist of a series of claims about 
phenomena: a text outlining what is known about the entities and processes targeted by the bio-
ontology. As in the case of any other text, the interpretation given to these claims depends partly on 
the interpretation given to the definitions assigned to the terms and relations used; and the 
hierarchical structure given to the terms implies that changes to the definition of one term, or to the 
relationship linking two terms in the network, have the potential to shift the meaning of all other 
claims in the same network.  
 
Yet, definitions are not the only tool available to researchers in order to interpret claims contained 
in a bio-ontology. Claims are also assessed through the evaluation of the data that has been linked 
to each of the terms involved. This is possible through the consultation of meta-data, i.e. 
information about the experimental context in which data were originally produced, which helps 
users to assess their evidential value for the purposes of their own research interests. Examples of 
meta-data include the specification of the organism(s) on which data were obtained; the names of 
researchers involved in that experiment and the publications through which it was disclosed; and 
the instruments, experimental set-up and protocols used to collect data (Brooksbank and 
Quakenbush 2006). The choice and insertion of meta-data is a crucial step in the development of a 
bio-ontology, because it enables users to investigate the experimental circumstances in which data 
retrieved through the bio-ontologies have been gathered, thus putting them in a position to evaluate 
the interpretation given to the data by their producers (if any) and the way in which they support (or 
not) the claims made in the bio-ontology. For example, a researcher interested in neural crest 
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formation can investigate the validity of the claim ‘neural crest formation is an epithelial to 
mesenchymal transition’ by checking which data were used to validate that assertion (i.e. to link the 
term ‘neural crest formation’ with the term ‘epithelial to mesenchymal transition’ via the relation 
‘is_a’), what organism they were extracted from, which procedures were used to obtain them and 
who conducted that research. As a result, the researcher can appeal to her own understanding of 
what constitutes a reliable experimental set-up, a trustworthy research group and an adequate model 
organism in order to interpret the quality of the data in question as evidence for the claim. 
 
2. From Dissemination to Discovery 
The opportunity for researchers to give empirical as well as conceptual meaning to claims about 
phenomena is what ultimately makes bio-ontologies different from a textbook and from other kinds 
of classification systems. Bio-ontologies like the Gene Ontology aim to incorporate two kinds of 
biological knowledge, both of which turn out to be indispensable to mining data for the purposes of 
discovery. The first is propositional knowledge about phenomena, which is represented as a series 
of interrelated claims as discussed above; the second is practical knowledge about data production, 
which is represented through meta-data. Much effort is invested in making sure that the choice of 
terms, definitions and relations represented in a bio-ontology is corroborated by existing, peer-
reviewed literature and intelligible to users coming from different disciplines. The same is true of 
the choice of what counts as meta-data. Terms, definitions, relations and meta-data are selected and 
defined through consensus-seeking mechanisms implemented on a global scale, such as 
consultations and workshops. Knowledge represented in a bio-ontology has been carefully 
processed so as to be intelligible across as many contexts as possible (Leonelli 2010). 
 
It is curators who are mainly responsible for processing existing knowledge for incorporation into 
bio-ontologies (Howe et al 2008). They formulate a definition for each term by consulting the 
available literature and experts in relevant fields. At the same time, they define the experimental 
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provenance of data linked to bio-ontology terms in ways that enable users to verify the accuracy 
and relevance of data to the curators’ interpretation. Curators hope in this way to acquire as much 
control as possible over the meaning attributed by users to each term and relation, and thus over the 
interpretation given to the claims about phenomena represented within bio-ontologies. Yet, what is 
interesting about bio-ontologies from the epistemic viewpoint is precisely the impossibility to 
exercise complete control over their interpretation and validity within an experimental context. 
Once the knowledge therein contained is brought back to the lab, the definitions provided by 
curators become one of several factors affecting users’ interpretation of the data retrieved and of the 
claims about phenomena to which data have been connected. Unavoidably, experimentalists 
evaluate knowledge claims through the lens of their own expertise, their familiarity with 
instruments and materials, their specific background and interests, and of course their own findings. 
Far from being disruptive to curators’ work, this fusion of users’ local interpretation with the 
curators’ efforts to globalise knowledge is what makes bio-ontologies into a unique and precious 
research tool. In their attempt to capture biological knowledge as it is produced in the lab, bio-
ontologies act as a bridge between the context of experimental research, which produces and re-uses 
data towards discovery, and the context of bioinformatics, in which data are processed and 
classified so as to be disseminated as widely as possible. Such a bridge is indispensable within data-
intensive research practices, where the iteration between data analysis and experimental research is 
as difficult to achieve as it is indispensable to scientific progress. Without curators’ effort to 
globalise the knowledge expressed within bio-ontologies, computational tools such as databases 
would not succeed in making data accessible across research contexts and disciplines. Curators' 
judgment in selecting terms, relations, relevant data and meta-data is crucial, as testified by the 
increasing professionalization of the skills and training needed to make those choices (Leonelli 
2010; Chow-White and Garcia-Sanchos 2011); curators are also responsible for updates to the 
system in view of new scientific developments (Leonelli et al 2011). At the same time, the 
categories through which data are ordered and retrieved in bio-ontologies need to be appropriated 
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by each user, who has to integrate that knowledge with her unique background and interests in order 
to be able to re-use the data and to eventually revise that very knowledge. Hence, the meaning of 
knowledge statements within bio-ontologies is determined at least as much by users as it is by the 
definitions provided by curators. 
 
3. Bio-Ontologies as Classificatory Theories 
Much philosophical work on the characteristics and role of scientific theories has hitherto been 
grounded on the intuition that constructing a theory implies introducing a new language to talk 
about the natural world. This idea resonates with the Kuhnian understanding of incommensurability 
among paradigms, according to which paradigm shifts involve language shifts and even when key 
concepts stay the same, their meaning tends to differ (Kuhn 1962). More recently, this view has 
been explicitly defended by Lindley Darden (2006). In this section, I argue that bio-ontologies 
constitute a significant counter-example to this intuition: they constitute a form of scientific 
theorising that has the potential to affect the direction and practice of experimental biology in the 
long term, and yet they do not aim to introduce new language into biological discourse, but rather 
attempt to gather and express consensus on what constitutes established knowledge. In other words, 
bio-ontologies are an instance of how theory can emerge from the attempt to classify entities in the 
world, rather than from the attempt to explain phenomena. Recognising this role for bio-ontologies 
involves accepting that descriptive predicates can all have theoretical value, regardless of the 
generality and the novelty of the concepts that they contain – regardless, that is, of whether they can 
be clearly differentiated from empirical observations and whether they challenge existing 
knowledge claims. As I intend to show, whether descriptive predicates constitute a form of theory 
depends on the role that they play within the life-cycle of experimental research. Indeed, I shall 
argue that recognising this role for bio-ontologies sheds light on the epistemic features of data-
intensive science, and particularly on interactions between theory-making and experimentation that 
characterise this mode of research: viewing bio-ontologies as theories illustrates how the theoretical 
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claims underlying data classification can only be interpreted through consultation of the evidence 
supporting those claims, and thus through familiarity with the experimental practices through which 
that evidence has been produced. 
 
As a starting point, I use Mary Hesse’s network model of scientific theories (1980). In that view, 
theories are defined as networks of interrelated terms. The meaning of each term depends both on 
the definition given to the phenomenon to which the term applies and on its relation to other terms. 
Relations among terms are expressed by way of law-like statements (for instance, Newtonian 
mechanics includes the terms ‘mass’ and ‘force’, which are related by the law-like statement ‘force 
is proportional to mass times acceleration’). Theories can thus be propositionally expressed by 
enunciating the series of law-like statements defining the relations among the terms used to refer to 
phenomena. Within this framework, Hesse argues that ‘there is no distinction in kind between a 
theoretical and an observation language’ (1980, 108). What Hesse means is that scientific language 
is replete with descriptive statements, whose truth depends on two fundamental factors: (1) their 
relation to other statements used in science to describe related phenomena (what Hesse calls ‘the 
coherence of the network of theory’); and (2) their relation to various kinds of evidence (‘empirical 
input’; Hesse 1980, 97). These descriptive statements may vary greatly with respect to the scope of 
phenomena to which they may be applied; the degree of generality of the concepts that they 
incorporate; and their degree of abstraction from specific empirical instances. Nevertheless, there is 
no obvious way to divide those statements in two distinct epistemic classes, one ‘theoretical’ and 
one ‘observational’. The consequence of this realisation is to state that all descriptive statements 
have a theoretical value, and can be treated as theory depending on their context of use. 
 
I find that this picture of how theory works in experimental science neatly fits the case of bio-
ontologies. Bio-ontologies are a network of terms defined by a predicate (the definition of the term) 
as well as by a specified set of empirical evidence (the data classified under that term). The terms 
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are related so as to form descriptive sentences applicable to a variety of empirical situations, such as 
‘a nucleus is part of a cell’. The truth of such statements depends on the truth of the definitions 
provided for each of the terms used, on the relation stipulated between each statement and the rest 
of the network of which it is part, and on its relation with available evidence as gauged by 
scientists. In other words, descriptive sentences captured in bio-ontologies have the same epistemic 
role as testable hypotheses: they are theoretical statements whose validity and meaning can only be 
interpreted and assessed with reference to empirical evidence and the conditions under which that 
evidence has been produced. Some of the biologists with whom I discussed this view initially 
resisted my characterisation of bio-ontologies as forms of theory: they understood biological 
theories as needing to express something that is not yet empirically established or that is very new, 
rather than what is already known. At the same time, they agreed that bio-ontologies are supposed 
to include ‘all we know’ about biology, and thus fit a view of theory as expressing existing 
knowledge about biological phenomena (including, but not limited to, newly available knowledge). 
The following passage, taken from an email sent to me by the director of a major center for the 
elaboration of bio-ontologies, illustrates the point:  
‘the relationships we capture tend to be the more basic and universally accepted 
ones, not those that are currently evolving as biological knowledge is extended. 
Perhaps that is why biologists do not think of database design as the highest level of 
our field, analogous to a mathematical model for the universe. I think ontology 
structure is closer to a true conceptual model, but even there the relationships 
captured are not on the cutting edge of biology but those that are already generally 
agreed on and not controversial’ (27 August 2004). 
 
Hesse argues that the choice, use and modification of each term and relation expressed in a network 
depends on the empirical study of the phenomena that those terms and relations are supposed to 
describe, and thus on the complex processes of experimentation, intervention and classification 
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involved in empirical research (Hesse 1980, 84; 1974, 4-26). Thus, the theoretical representation of 
knowledge is instrumental to the goals and needs of empirical research. Similarly, bio-ontologies 
consist of a string of accurately defined, basic terms with clearly outlined reference to specific 
phenomena. As I have stressed, the main motivation behind the development of bio-ontologies is to 
facilitate the integration of data about all aspects of the biology of organisms. This means that the 
nature of the data available, as well as their format and the methods used by the laboratories that 
collected them, inform all decisions about which terms to use, how to define them and how to relate 
them to each other. In line with Hesse’s arguments, terms are not defined on the basis of purely 
theoretical considerations, but they are formulated to fit the investigations actually carried out by 
empirical scientists. Terms referring to entities and processes that are not under investigation, and 
therefore do not have data associated to them, are not incorporated in bio-ontologies; similarly, 
definitions are often formulated through the observational language used by empirical researchers. 
 
This became very clear to me when attending a Gene Ontology Content Meeting dedicated 
specifically to the terms metabolism and pathogen, two notions that are notoriously difficult to 
define and treated differently depending on the subdiscipline of interest (Gene Ontology 2004). 
Discussion among the immunologists, geneticists, developmental and molecular biologists 
attending the meeting started from a tentative definition of the terms and progressed by correcting 
that initial definition so that it would fit counter-examples. Most counter-examples were provided in 
the form of actual observations from the bench or the field. For instance, the proposal that 
pathogens be treated as an independent category from organelles, which was popular among 
immunologists, was dismissed by ecologists and physiologists on the basis of cases of 
endosymbiosis where pathogens turn out to be both symbionts and parasites of the same organism. 
In these cases, it was argued that pathogens cannot be treated as a separate, independent category 
from other microscopic components of the host’s cell, since they also play a role towards the well-
functioning of the cell as a whole. According to specialists in endosymbiosis and its role towards 
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plant development, these pathogens should therefore figure as ‘part_of’ the cell, rather than as a 
separate entity with no relations to it. Certain kinds of bacteria (such as nitrogen-fixing bacteria) can have 
at the same time mutualistic and parasitic associations with the plants that host them (see Vernon and Paracer 
2000). Thus, on the basis of observed cases, a whole theoretical category (the one of ‘pathogen’) 
was modified to fit a different context and definition. 
 
This example shows how one of the keys to the successful functioning of bio-ontologies is precisely 
the avoidance of distinctions between theoretical and observational language and related concerns. 
Bio-ontologies are meant to represent knowledge about existing phenomena as currently 
investigated, rather than to make sense of them through detailed explanations or daring new 
hypotheses. For that purpose, it does not matter that bio-ontologies do not, and were never intended 
to, introduce new theoretical terms to explain biological phenomena. Not all scientific theories 
operate in that way,5 nor are they all meant as sweeping, general perspectives unifying a whole 
discipline (as in the well-known cases of the central dogma within genetics or of evolutionary 
theory). Bio-ontologies are better understood as what I shall call classificatory theories. These are 
theories that emerge from a classificatory effort, in the sense that they aim to represent the body of 
knowledge available in a given field so as to enable the dissemination and retrieval of research 
materials within it; are subject to systematic scrutiny and interpretation on the basis of empirical 
evidence; affect the ways in which research in that field is discussed and conducted in the long 
term; and – most importantly if we are to regard them as theories – express the conceptual 
significance of the results gathered through empirical research.   
 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, Darden quotes Hesse’s older work on analogies as supporting her intuition about the 
novelty of theoretical language (Darden 2006, 150). As I have shown here, Hesse actually changed 
her mind on this point.  
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As I highlighted above, bio-ontologies are developed through complex mediation between curators 
aiming to produce general definitions of entities and biologists interested in preserving the local 
definition used for those entities within their own research context. They are thus developed as 
cross-disciplinary communication tools, representations of knowledge that are general enough to fit 
most research contexts in biology, yet specific enough to capture local nuances and semantic 
diversity across epistemic cultures. What is remarkable about this achievement is its context-
dependence. Bio-ontologies are supposed to capture domains of knowledge which are constantly 
evolving, both internally and in their interaction with each other. It is no wonder that curators 
struggle to keep up with biological developments (Parkhill et al 2010); and one crucial reason for 
curators to worry about lagging behind is the foundational role played by bio-ontologies in guiding 
the interpretation of data found online. Researchers who use bio-ontologies for data retrieval 
implicitly accept, even if they might not be aware of it, the representation of biological entities and 
processes contained within bio-ontologies at the moment in which they are consulted. This can have 
dramatic effects on how data are used in subsequent research (e.g. Leonelli and Ankeny 2012). And 
it is because of this crucial role in expressing available knowledge of biological phenomena, and 
thus guiding and structuring subsequent research, that bio-ontologies are best regarded as a form of 
theory.  
 
One important objection might be raised at this point: why should we regard bio-ontologies as 
theories, rather than as yet another important component of scientific practice which affects, and yet 
does not constitute, theoretical knowledge? This objection seems especially strong in light of recent 
literature on the role played by elements other than theory, such as models, experiments and 
instruments, in shaping scientific research. However, what needs to be noted is that bio-ontologies 
are not simply influencing knowledge-making practices in biology in the way that a type of model 
or instrument would. Bio-ontologies certainly have the potential to structure and direct experimental 
inquiry in data-intensive science. But the reason for their epistemic power is that they actually 
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express, rather than simply affecting, the knowledge obtained through scientific research. The 
knowledge that they express is best understood in relation to the collection of models, instruments 
and commitments made by the researchers who produced it, as in the case of any scientific theory;6 
and yet, that knowledge cannot be reduced to any of those elements of scientific practice, and 
actually provides a way to link and evaluate the epistemic results of using specific methods and 
tools to research nature. By virtue of their structure, their irreducibility to specific models (or even 
clusters of models) and, above all, their capacity to express scientific knowledge of biological 
phenomena in a way that summarises and directs empirical results, bio-ontologies are best viewed 
as theories rather than as scientific models or instruments. 
 
This view of theory is certainly different from the sets of equations and axioms traditionally 
discussed in the context of the physical sciences. It is, however, not a newcomer within the 
philosophy of science. It parallels Claude Bernard’s idea of theory as a ‘stairway’ towards the 
establishment of new scientific facts: ‘by climbing, science widens its horizons more and more, 
because theories embody and necessarily include proportionately more facts as they advance’ 
(1855, 165). Theoretical claims in this view are what brings us from one observation to the next, 
and make it possible to develop complex explanations.7 Understood in this way, descriptive 
                                                 
6 The importance of models in understanding theories has been widely discussed, for instance in 
recent work by James Griesemer (e.g. 2006) and by contributors to de Regt, Leonelli and Eigner 
(2009). 
7 In a similar vein, Kenneth Schaffner has offered a sophisticated view of ‘middle-range theories’ as 
devices for knowledge representation and discovery, in which he even briefly explored the 
usefulness of object-oriented approaches to programming (the ancestors of bio-ontologies) as a way 
of expressing theoretical commitments (1993). I see his approach as very congenial to mine, yet I 
am not considering it in detail here because of his different emphasis and targets (the role of law-
like statements in biology and their relations to theories in physics and chemistry). 
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statements such as used to classify biological organisms within the taxonomic tradition could be 
seen as theoretical. This claim constitutes a step further than previous claims about the profound 
conceptual implications of specific taxonomies, especially concerning the conceptualization of 
organisms in biology, as put forward chiefly by John Dupré (1993, 2001 and, jointly with 
O’Malley, 2007). While Dupré argues that the classification of species and biological individuals 
has huge consequences for biological theory, I am arguing here that such classifications may 
sometimes even constitute theory in biology. It is important to note, however, that I am not arguing 
that all scientific classifications should be regarded as theories.8 Rather, I am arguing that some 
classifications can play the role of theories depending on the extent to which they embody and 
express a specific interpretation of the overall significance of a set of empirical results – as in the 
case of bio-ontologies. Whether other classifications, such as the ones used in the natural history 
tradition or contemporary taxonomy, fit this requirement remains a topic for further debate. Staffan 
Mueller-Wille’s reading of the classificatory practices used by Linnaeus, which he views as guided 
by the need to order and summarise data pouring in Linneaus’ study from all corners of the globe, 
and yet resulting in a specific interpretation (an ‘ontological scaffold’) of the biological significance 
of those data, could indeed be interpreted as indicating that the Linnean classification system 
functioned as a theory in 18th century botany (Mueller-Wille 2007, with Charmantier 2012). 
Similarly, the arguments recently put forward by Bruno Strasser on the intertwining of experimental 
and classificatory practices in the construction of databases such as GenBank point to a potentially 
theoretical role of the classification of protein sequences in the context of 1970s-80s molecular 
biology (e.g. Strasser 2011). 
 
 
4. Conclusions: Theories in Data-Driven Research 
                                                 
8 I thank the editor for inviting me to stress this important point. 
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I have defended the view that bio-ontologies such as the Gene Ontology play the role of 
classificatory theories in data-intensive research modes. They consist of an explicitly formulated 
series of claims about biological phenomena, which is understood in relation to the methods, 
materials and instruments used to experiment on those phenomena and routinely adapted to 
scientific developments. On the one hand, they express the propositional knowledge that is relied 
upon when ordering data for the purpose of further dissemination and analysis, knowledge which 
expresses current understandings of the significance of data towards understanding biological 
phenomena and which can be challenged and modified depending on shifts in research contexts. On 
the other hand, their interpretation is grounded in tacit knowledge of the instruments, models and 
protocols characterising experimental research in biology. Bio-ontologies thus constitute an 
interesting example of how theory can emerge from classificatory practices in conjunction with 
experimental know-how. They express what is currently known about biological entities or 
processes, in order to further the study of those entities and processes through coordination among 
research projects and exchange of relevant data. They explicitly formulate knowledge that is taken 
to be widely assumed, yet is usually dispersed across publications and research groups. They need 
not be true or universal; rather, they capture the assumptions, interpretations and practices 
underlying the successful sharing and re-use of data within very specific contexts at a given 
moment in time.9 This makes them into representations of the biological knowledge underlying 
data-intensive science. 
 
This view has a number of far-reaching implications. One concerns the epistemic role of 
classification as a scientific method. At least since Francis Bacon’s discussion of ‘idols of the 
human mind’, and passing through Pierre Duhem’s work on theory as an aid to experimentation, 
                                                 
9 This views contrasts with some aspects of the interpretation of ontology realism given by Smith 
and Ceuster (2010). A paper discussing the parallels and differences between these two views is in 
preparation.  
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classification systems have been recognised as unavoidably theory-laden. However, their role as 
active tools towards the exploration of the natural world and the discovery of new phenomena has 
been underestimated within the philosophy of science, despite the pioneering work by Ian Hacking 
(2002) and John Pickstone (2000) in highlighting the role of natural history as, respectively, a key 
style of reasoning and a way of doing in science. Consider for instance the debate on the existence 
and function of natural kinds, which can be read as focusing precisely on the implication of 
adopting specific classification systems to study the natural world. Traditionally, this debate has 
largely revolved around the issue of essentialism. Only recently has research focused on the ways in 
which scientists actually use natural kind terms in their research (Dupre 1993). Terms within bio-
ontologies can be seen as ‘kinds’ in the sense suggested by Brigandt (2009) and Reydon (2010): 
that is, not as capturing some intrinsic and unchangeable feature of entities in the world, but rather 
as capturing scientists’ current assumptions about what exists – the necessary (and yet revisable) 
background knowledge on which inquiry rests. Emphasising the epistemic role of bio-ontologies as 
theories involves highlighting the tight interrelation between the use and interpretation of specific 
classificatory categories, the set-up of experiments and the analysis of experimental results. 
Classification is, in this view, a key scientific activity that is actively pursued throughout the 
research process and has profound effects on its results and methods.  
 
Another philosophical realm affected by my argument is, quite obviously, the conceptualisation of 
scientific theories. Over the last three decades, several philosophers have defended a deflationary 
view of theory broadly in line with Hesse’s suggestions discussed above. Some of this work has 
focused on the nature of law-like statements (Cartwright 1983, Mitchell 2003) or on cases of 
scientific research where laws have arguably little or no role to play (Creager et al 2007). Some of 
the semantic conceptions of scientific theory, with their emphasis on various types of models 
(including material ones) collectively embodying theory, also fit this deflationary bandwagon (e.g. 
Giere 1999). Yet another relevant body of literature focuses on the nature of phenomena and their 
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relationship to empirical reality (Bogen and Woodward 1988, McAllister 1997). The implications 
of my views for each of these debates need to be explored in detail. Claims within bio-ontologies 
can be interpreted as law-like in the phenomenological sense advocated by Cartwright (1983). And 
if, as argued by Bogen and Woodward (1988), phenomena are conceptualised as low-level 
descriptions of real entities and processes, they may amount to theories in the classificatory sense 
that I have defended, depending on their function within any given research context. Notably, 
semantic views of theories do not sit comfortably with this position, as argued for instance by 
Margaret Morrison (2000) and James Griesemer (e.g. 2006). Classificatory theory as embodied by 
bio-ontologies can be kept apart from the various types of models built to make biological sense of 
the data retrieved from databases (such as the visualisations of data proposed within model 
organism databases): bio-ontologies constitute the cluster of theoretical commitments on the basis 
of which objects and processes are tracked (to use Griesemer’s terminology) and models of them 
can be built. My account is thus in line with the ‘mediator’ view of models (Morgan and Morrison 
1999), according to which models are not themselves part of theories but rather function 
autonomously as bridges between theory (in my case, classificatory theory) and the world 
(biological entities and processes as targeted within bio-ontologies). 
 
Thirdly, my views have implications for the debate on scientific realism. Prima facie, it might seem 
that viewing bio-ontologies as theories is in contrast with the realist commitments that bio-
ontologies seem to express and that are often attributed to them by curators (for instance, when 
insisting that bio-ontologies represent ‘the reality captured by the underlying biological science’; 
Hill et al 2008). I do not this that such conflict exists. Of course bio-ontologies do and should refer 
to real entities in the world. This does not mean that the knowledge we have of these entities is firm 
and infallible. Indeed, many scientists prefer to think of their knowledge as tentative rather than 
conclusive. A leading curator of a model organism database recently told me that she finds 
biologists to be put off by the assertive, unambiguous language used by bio-ontologies to express 
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knowledge. Formulations such as ‘X is Y’ or ‘A regulates B’ are often interpreted by biologists as 
implying the unwarranted transformation of unverified statistical correlations into well-established 
causal claims. That absence of qualifiers and nuances makes biologists uncomfortable precisely 
because they know that several of these claims have not been conclusively proven and could very 
well turn out to be mistaken in the future. Thinking of bio-ontologies as theories takes nothing away 
from the curators’ realist commitments to providing the best possible representation of what is 
currently known in biology. Rather, this interpretation stresses that bio-ontologies are as fallible, 
dynamic and revisable expressions of biological knowledge, and that is indeed what makes it such 
an efficient tool for discovery in data-intensive science.10 Viewing bio-ontologies as theories could 
actually help to ease the uneasiness felt by many biologists towards data-intensive methods, by 
uncovering the conceptual work underlying the development of databases and thus alerting 
biologists to the pitfalls of an uncritical use of these tools and to the need for constructive critique 
and expert feedback in order to improve their accuracy and reliability. 
 
Finally, and coming back to the question initially raised in this paper, viewing bio-ontologies as a 
type of theory sheds light on the epistemic features of data-intensive science as a research mode. It 
illustrates how the procedures used to extract patterns from data are not purely inductive, but rather 
rely on a complex conceptual structure that is used to collect and retrieve data in the first place. It 
also shows how this process requires knowledge about the provenance of data and adequate tacit 
skills facilitating the use of that information to evaluate the claims fostered in bio-ontologies. 
Further, viewing bio-ontologies as theories facilitates an understanding of how crucial information 
technology is becoming not only to experimentation, but also to scientific reasoning. At the same 
time, emphasising the theoretical work embedded in computational data analysis constitutes a 
useful counter-point to the sometimes exaggerated role attributed to automation in data-intensive 
                                                 
10 This view parallels the endorsement of scientific perspectivism in the analysis of data-intensive 
science presented by Callebaut (2012). 
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science (Evans and Rzhesky 2010). While digital infrastructure is crucial in shaping reasoning and 
'random' searches, the interpretation of the biological significance of data is grounded in 
experimental knowledge and awareness of theoretical framing within bio-ontologies. Curators and 
experimentalists contribute interpretive input through manual interventions, and informal elements 
such as tacit skills and experimental familiarity with organisms play a key role in the assessment of 
the reliability of data and their evidential value. Database curators are the first to acknowledge that 
the re-use of data retrieved through automated searches stands in a complex relation to experimental 
and modelling practices. The automated analysis of datasets in silico provides the best opportunities 
for discovery when it is used in parallel to in vivo and in vitro experimentation. 
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